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Abstract 
We introduce a novel multimodal mobile database called Hu-
MIdb (Human Mobile Interaction database) that comprises 
14 mobile sensors acquired from 600 users. The heterogene-
ous flow of data generated during the interaction with the 
smartphones can be used to model human behavior when in-
teracting with the technology. Based on this new dataset, we 
explore the capacity of smartphone sensors to improve bot 
detection. We propose a CAPTCHA method based on the 
analysis of the information obtained during a single drag and 
drop task. We evaluate the method generating fake samples 
synthesized with Generative Adversarial Neural Networks 
and handcrafted methods. Our results suggest the potential of 
mobile sensors to characterize the human behavior and de-
velop a new generation of CAPTCHAs. 
1. Introduction   
The research interest in smartphone devices has been con-
stantly growing in the last years. The capacity of these de-
vices to acquire, process, and storage a wide range of heter-
ogeneous data offers many possibilities and research lines: 
user authentication (Frank et al. 2013; Patel et al. 2016; 
Voris et al. 2016; Monaco and Tappert 2018; Fierrez et al. 
2018a), health monitoring (Albert et al. 2012; Arroyo-
Gallego et al. 2017), behavior monitoring (Pei et al. 2010; 
Salem et al. 2014; Chen et al. 2015; Dua et al. 2019; Tavako-
lian et al. 2019), etc. Besides, the usage of mobile phones is 
ubiquitous. Mobile lines exceeded world population in 
2018, and the amount of smartphones devices sold sur-
passed world population in 2014. This is one of the fastest 
growing manmade phenomenon ever, from 0 to 7.2 billion 
in barely three decades. In the same way, this widget has 
changed the way we access and create contents in internet. 
Recent surveys reveal that nearly three quarters (72.6%) of 
internet users will access the web via their smartphones by 
2025. In fact, almost 51% of web access are actually made 
through mobile phones1.  
 
 
1 https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/24/smartphones-72percent-of-people-
will-use-only-mobile-for-internet-by-2025.html 
 
 On the other hand, mobile web hazards are growing very 
fast as well. Malicious malware is also adapting to this new 
mobile era. Mobile bots employ the capacities of 
smartphones affecting multiples types of online services, 
such us: social media (e.g. mobile bots accounts propagate 
fake twitter messages (Chu et al. 2010), ticketing/travel, e-
commerce, finance, gambling, ATO/Fraud, DDOs attacks, 
and price scrapping among others. According to (Distil 
2018), these mobile bots use cellular networks by connect-
ing through cellular gateways. Mobile bots can perform 
highly advanced attacks while remaining hidden in plain 
sight. In addition, they are very unlikely to be detected by IP 
address blocking. The Distil Research Lab showed that 
5.8% of all mobile devices on cellular networks are used in 
malicious bot attacks (Distil 2018). In other study (Threat 
Metrix 2018), researchers reveal that mobile fraud reached 
150 million global attacks in the first half of 2018 with at-
tack rates rising 24% year-over-year. 
 In this context, new countermeasures against fraud 
adapted to mobile scenarios are necessary. One of the most 
popular methods to distinguish between humans and bots is 
known as CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Tu-
ring test to tell Computers and Humans Apart). These algo-
rithms determine whether or not the user is human by pre-
senting challenges associated to the cognitive capacities of 
the human beings. The most common challenges are: recog-
nizing characters from a distorted image (text-based CAP-
TCHAs); identifying class-objects in a set of images (image-
based CAPTCHAs); speech translation from distorted au-
dios (sound-based audio CAPTCHAs); or newer systems 
that replace traditional cognitive tasks by a transparent algo-
rithm capable of detecting bots and humans from their web 
behavior (reCAPTCHA 2019). However, recent advances in 
areas such as computer vision, speech recognition, or natural 
language processing have increased the vulnerabilities of 
CAPTCHA systems (Bursztein et al. 2011; Block et al. 
2017; Akrout et al. 2019). Major advances in deep learning 
  
applied in those areas enable the generation of synthetic data 
of very natural appearance, therefore increasingly difficult 
to detect if used by bots. 
 Most of the current CAPTCHAs have been designed to 
be used in a web interaction based on mouse and keyboard 
interfaces. In this paper we explore the potential of mobile 
devices to detect human-machine interaction. The main con-
tributions are twofold: i) a new public HuMIdb (Human Mo-
bile Interaction database) that characterize the interaction of 
600 users according to 14 sensors during normal human-mo-
bile interactions in an unsupervised scenario with more than 
200 different devices; ii) we propose a new Behavioral 
CAPTCHA system (called BeCAPTCHA2) based on mod-
elling the user behavior in smartphone interaction using 
multiple inbuilt sensors. 
 
1.1. Multimodal Mobile Datasets 
Table 1 summarizes previous multimodal mobile databases. 
UMDAA-02 (Mahbub et al. 2016b) is a multimodal mobile 
database that includes 14 mobile sensors: front camera, 
touchscreen, gyroscope, accelerometer, magnetometer, light 
sensor, GPS, Bluetooth, WiFi, proximity sensor, tempera-
ture sensor, and pressure sensor. The data was collected dur-
ing 2 months from 48 volunteers in an unsupervised scenario 
with 248 sessions per user in average and using the same 
smartphone (Nexus 5). In (Li and Bours 2018a), WiFi and 
 
2 Spanish Patent Application P202030066 
accelerometer mobile signals were collected from 312 par-
ticipants in an unsupervised scenario during a period of 1 
month. In (Li and Bours 2018b), the same authors captured 
accelerometer and gyroscope mobile data from 304 partici-
pants in an unsupervised scenario with 90 sessions per user 
in average. Fridman et al. (2017) collected a multimodal mo-
bile dataset that contains stylometry, app usage, web brows-
ing, and GPS behavioral biometrics data from 200 subjects 
over a period of 5 months. They launched a mobile applica-
tion that acquired the mobile data during natural mobile-hu-
man interactions (unsupervised scenario). They also men-
tion that the main problem in the acquisition process was the 
battery drain, as the app was recording all the time the 
smartphone was on. In other work (Liu et al. 2018), the au-
thors collect touch gestures, power consumption, accel-
erometer, gyroscope, and magnetometer mobile signals 
from 10 participants under laboratory conditions and with 
the same mobile device (supervised scenario) during a pe-
riod of three hours. Shen et al. (2018) collected accelerom-
eter, gyroscope, orientation, and magnetometer mobile sen-
sors from 102 subjects for active mobile authentication in an 
unsupervised scenario. During the acquisition they covered 
three smartphone-operating environments: hand-hold, table-
hold, and hand-hold-walking. In a recent work (Deb et al. 
2019), the authors collected up to 30 mobile sensor signals 
from 37 volunteers over a period of 15 days with an Android 
Ref. Sensors #Us-
ers 
Ses-
sions/user 
Super-
vised 
Pub-
lic 
De-
vice 
Task 
Mahbub et al. 2016b 
13 (Key, Cam, Tou, Gyr, Acc, Mag, 
Lig, GPS, Blu, WiF, Pro, Tem, Pres) 
54 ~248 No Yes Shared Free 
Li and Bours 2018a 2 (WiF, Acc) 312 1 Month No No Own Free 
Li and Bours 2018b 2 (Acc, Gyr) 304 
~90 Ses-
sions 
No No Own Free 
Fridman et al. 2017 3 (App, Web, GPS) 200 5 Months No No Own Free 
Liu et al. 2018 5 (Tou, Pow, Acc, Gyr, Mag) 10 3 Hours Yes No Shared Free 
Shen et al. 2018 4 (Acc, Gyr, Mag, Ori) 102 
20 - 50 
Days 
No Yes Shared Free 
Deb et al. 2019 
8 (Key, GPS, Acc, Gyr, Mag, Acc, 
Gra, Rot) 
37 15 Days No No Own Free 
Tolosana et al. 2019 3 (Touch, Acc, Gyr) 217 ≤6 No Yes Own Fixed 
HuMIdb 
14 (Acc, LAc, Gyr, Mag, Pro, Gra, 
Lig, Tou, GPS, WiF, Blu, Mic, Key, 
Ori) 
600 ≤5 No Yes Own Fixed 
Table 1. Summary of the existing multimodal mobile databases. Key- Keystroke, Acc- Accelerometer, Cam- Front camera, Touch- Touch 
gestures, Gyr- Gyroscope, Mag- Magnetometer, Prox- Proximity, Temp- Temperature, Press- Pressure, App- App usage, Web- Web 
browsing, Pow- Power consumption, Gra- Gravity, Rot- Rotation, LAc- Linear accelerometer, Mic- Microphone, Ori- Orientation. Task 
column shows whether the mobile sensors were recorded in the wild or while users completed prefixed tasks. 
 
  
application that works in background and acquire the mobile 
data passively. Finally, Tolosana et al. (2019) collect a da-
tabase of mobile touch on-line data named Mo-
bileTouchDB. The database is focused in mobile touch pat-
terns and contains more than 64K on-line character samples 
performed by 217 users with a total of 6 sessions. They also 
acquired accelerometer and gyroscope signals under unsu-
pervised conditions. 
2. The HuMI Database  
In this section we introduce the Human Mobile Interaction 
database (HuMIdb), a novel multimodal mobile database 
that comprises more than 5 GB from a wide range of mobile 
sensors acquired under unsupervised scenario. The database 
includes 14 sensors (see Table 2 for the details) during nat-
ural human-mobile interaction performed by 600 users. For 
the acquisition, we implemented an Android application that 
collects the sensor signals while the users complete 8 simple 
tasks with their own smartphones and without any supervi-
sion whatsoever (i.e., the users could be standing, sitting, 
walking, indoors, outdoors, at daytime or night, etc.). The 
different tasks are designed to reflect the most common in-
teraction with mobile devices: keystroke (name, surname, 
and a pre-defined sentence), tap (press a sequence of but-
tons), swipe (up and down directions), air movements (circle 
and cross gestures in the air), handwriting (digits from 0 to 
9), and voice (record the sentence I’m not a robot). Addi-
tionally, there is a drag and drop button between tasks. 
 The acquisition protocol comprises 5 sessions with at 
least 1 day gap among them. It is important to highlight that 
in all sessions, the 1-day gap refers to the minimum time 
between one user finishes a session and the next time the app 
allows to have the next session. At the beginning of each 
task, the app shows a brief pop up message explaining the 
procedure to complete each task. The application also cap-
tures the orientation (landscape/portrait) of the smartphone, 
the screen size, resolution, the model of the device, and the 
date when the session was captured. 
 Regarding the age distribution, 25.6% of the users were 
younger than 20 years old, 49.4% are between 20 and 30 
years old, 19.2% between 30 and 50 years old, and the re-
maining 5.8% are older than 50 years old. Regarding the 
gender, 66.5% of the participants were males, 32.8% fe-
males, and 0.7% others. Participants performed the tasks 
from 14 different countries (52.2%/47.0%/0.8% from Eu-
rope, America, and Asia respectively) using 278 different 
devices. The database was captured using an app developed 
specifically for this work. All users were informed about the 
sensors and information captured, and all users have signed 
the necessary consent agreement. The information is cap-
tured only during the usage of the app and all data were 
anonymized. 
 Figure 1 shows an example of the handwriting task (for 
digit “5”) and the information collected during the task. 
Note how a simple task can generate a heterogeneous flow 
of information related with the user behavior: the way the 
user holds the device, the power and velocity of the gesture, 
the place, etc. 
Figure 1. Full set of data generated during one of the HuMIdb task. 
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3. BeCAPTCHA: Detecting Human           
Behavior from Mobile Inbuilt Sensors    
HuMIdb offers the opportunity to model human behavior. 
Among the multiple applications, in this work we will ex-
plore the use of human interaction to develop a new genera-
tion of CAPTCHA systems based on mobile inbuilt sensors. 
We propose to employ the right swipe gesture captured at 
the end of each HuMIdb task (drag and drop action when the 
user scrolls the Next button to the right). We propose to 
model the gesture according to features obtained from the 
touchscreen and accelerometer. To evaluate the CAPTCHA, 
we will employ human samples (from HuMIdb) and syn-
thetic ones (bot-like samples). We assume a challenging 
scenario where the attacker (malicious bot developer) can 
generate synthetic gestures trying to mimic the sensor sig-
nals generated during human-mobile interaction.  
 
3.1. Feature Extraction: Characterizing Swipe 
Gestures 
To characterize swipe gestures from the touchscreen and ac-
celerometer signals, we have adapted two feature sets previ-
ously employed in (Li and Bours 2018; Chu et al. 2018) for 
bot detection and user authentication respectively.  
 The interaction of the user with the Touch screen is de-
fined by a time sequence 𝐬T = {𝐱, 𝐲, 𝐩, 𝐭} with length N, 
composed by the coordinates {𝐱, 𝐲}, the pressure p (when 
available), and the timestamp t. First, the coordinates  
{𝐱, 𝐲} are normalized by the size of the screen. Second, the 
pressure is discarded as it is not available in most of the de-
vices. Third, the touch features consist of six global features 
defined in Table 3. 
 The accelerometer signal is defined by a sequence 𝐬A =
{𝐱, 𝐲, 𝐳, 𝐭}. The feature set chosen for the accelerometer sig-
nal was adapted from (Li and Bours 2018), in which they 
calculate the mean, median, root-mean-square, and standard 
deviation of the three accelerometer axes {𝐱, 𝐲, 𝐳} for user 
authentication. 
 
3.2. Generating Human-Like Gestures: Fakes  
A swipe gestures can be defined by a spatial trajectory (se-
quence of points {𝐱, 𝐲}) and a velocity profile determined by 
the timestamp sequence t. To generate synthetic swipe pat-
terns, we will follow two approaches: handcrafted synthesis 
and Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) synthesis. 
 
Method 1: Handcrafted Synthesis 
We observed that most of the human swipe trajectories ob-
tained from our drag and drop task are linear. The hand-
crafted approach generates swipe trajectories according to a 
straight line shape and a realistic velocity profile. For this, 
we first estimate the probability distribution of length and 
angle of human swipe gestures in HuMIdb. Note that the 
size and coordinates of each human swipe varies depending 
on the device features so we have normalized each one by 
the total size of the screen.  
Sensors 
Sampling 
Rate 
Features 
Power Con-
sumption 
Accelerometer 200 Hz 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 Low 
L.Accelerome-
ter 
200 Hz 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 Low 
Gyroscope 200 Hz 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 Low 
Magnetometer 200 Hz 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 Low 
Orientation NA 𝑙 or 𝑝 Low 
Proximity NA 𝑐𝑚 Low 
Gravity NA 𝑚/𝑠2 Low 
Light NA 𝑙𝑢𝑥 Low 
TouchScreen E 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑝 Medium 
Keystroke E key,  𝑝 Medium 
GPS NA 
Lat., Lon., 
Alt., 
Bearing, 
Accuracy 
Medium 
WiFi NA 
SSID, 
Level, 
Info, 
Channel, 
Frequency 
High 
Bluetooth NA SSID, MAC Medium 
Microphone 8 KHz Audio High 
Table 2. Description of all sensor signals captured in HuMIdb. 
E=Event-based acquisition. The timestamp parameter is captured 
for all sensors. 
 
Parameters Description 
Duration (𝐷) 𝑡𝑁 − 𝑡0 
Distance (𝐿) ‖(𝑥𝑁 , 𝑦𝑁) − (𝑥0, 𝑦0)‖ 
Displacement (𝑃) ∑‖(𝑥𝑖+1 − 𝑥𝑖) − (𝑦𝑖+1 − 𝑦𝑖)‖
𝑁−1
𝑖=0
 
Angle (𝛼) tan−1(|(𝑥𝑁 − 𝑥0| |(𝑦𝑁 − 𝑦0|⁄ )  
Mean velocity (𝑉) 
1
𝑁
∑ ‖(𝑥𝑖+1 − 𝑥𝑖) − (𝑦𝑖+1 − 𝑦𝑖)‖ (𝑡𝑖+1 − 𝑡𝑖)⁄
𝑁−1
𝑖=0
 
Move Efficiency (𝐸)  𝑃 𝐿⁄  
Table 3. Touch features extracted for the characterization of the 
gestures. 
 
  
 The synthetic trajectories are defined by the initial point 
(𝑥0, 𝑦0), duration (𝑡𝑁 − 𝑡0), angle (α), and the velocity pro-
file {𝒗, 𝐭}. We have synthesized the fake trajectories accord-
ing to distributions of these parameters fitted from human 
data (except for the velocity profile). With the aim to emu-
late human behaviors, we spaced the points of the linear tra-
jectory on a log scale (emulating a velocity profile with the 
initial acceleration observed in human samples).  
 The accelerometer signals are synthesized as random se-
quences generated from a Gaussian distribution with mean 
and standard deviation estimated from real accelerometer 
signals from HuMIdb. 
 
Method 2: GAN Synthesis 
For this approach, we employ a GAN (Generative Adver-
sarial Network) architecture firstly proposed by Goodfellow 
et al. (2014), in which two neuronal networks, commonly 
named Generator and Discriminator, are trained in adversar-
ial mode. The Generator tries to fool the Discriminator by 
generating fake samples (touch trajectories and accelerome-
ter signals in this work) very similar to the real ones, while 
the Discriminator has to discriminate between the real sam-
ples and the fake ones created (see Figure 2 for the details). 
Once the Generator is trained, then we can use it to synthe-
size swipe trajectories very similar to the real ones.  
 The topology employed in both Generator and Discrimi-
nator consist of two LSTM (Long Short-Term Memory) lay-
ers followed by a dense layer, very similar to a recurrent 
auto-encoder. The LSTM layers learn the time relationships 
of human swipe sequences, while the dense layer is used as 
a classification layer to distinguish between fake and real 
swipe trajectories in the Discriminator or to build synthetic 
mouse trajectories in the Generator. To synthesize accel-
erometer signals, we follow the same GAN architecture de-
scribed before, but extending the input of the generator from 
{𝐱, 𝐲} swipe coordinates to {𝐱, 𝐲, 𝐳} accelerometer axes. 
 
3.3. Experimental Protocol 
Both GAN networks were trained using more than 10K hu-
man samples extracted from the HuMIdb. Training details: 
learning rate 𝛼 = 2 ∙ 10−4, Adam optimizer with 𝛽1 =
0.5,  𝛽2 = 0.999, and 𝜀 = 10
−8. The system was trained for 
50 epochs with a batch size of 128 samples for both Gener-
ator and Discriminator. The loss function was ‘binary 
crossentropy’ for the Discriminator and ‘mean square er-
ror’ for the Generator.  The model was trained and tested in 
Keras-Tensorflow.  
 We generated 12K synthetic samples according to the two 
methods proposed. Once we have extracted the global fea-
tures from human and synthetic swipe trajectories (up to 
30K trajectories between both groups), we employ a SVM 
(Support Vector Machine) classifier with a RBF (Radial Ba-
sis Function). The experiments are divided into two differ-
ent scenarios depending on the training data employed: 
once-class or multiclass. In the one-class scenario, we train 
the SVM classifier using only the human samples and test 
with both human samples and synthetic ones, in order to 
study whether the classifier is able to detect bots as abnor-
mal human behavior. In the multiclass scenario, we train and 
test the SVM classifier with both human and synthetic sam-
ples in order to analyze whether the classifier is able to find 
discriminative features between both groups.  
 In both scenarios, there is not overlap between train and 
test sets. For each SVM, we train the classifier by using the 
70% of all samples and test with the 30% remaining (ran-
domly chosen). Each experiment was repeated 5 times and 
the results were computed as the average of the 5 iterations.  
4. Results and Discussion  
Table 4 shows the bot detection errors for the different syn-
thetic trajectories (in columns) generated in this work when 
comparing with the human ones. The results are presented 
in terms of EER (Equal Error Rate) defined as the point 
GAN Generator 
Figure 2. The proposed architecture to train a GAN Generator of synthetic swipe gestures characterized by touch 𝐬𝐓ෞ and accelerometer 𝐬𝐀ෞ 
sequences. The Generator learns the human features of the swipe gestures and generate human-like ones from Gaussian Noise and human 
sequences 𝐬𝐓, 𝐬𝐀. 
Gaussian Noise 
GAN synthetic 
swipe trajectories 
GAN Discriminator Human swipe trajectories HuMIdb 
 
Human  
 
 
Bot 
Swipe gesture  
loss 
Modify and Iterate 
𝐬T, 𝐬A 
𝐬Tෝ ,  𝐬Aෝ  
  
where FMR (False Match Rate) and FNMR (False Non-
Match Rate) are equal. 
 We can observe that the results achieved for the one-class 
classification scenario are significantly worse (higher er-
rors) than those achieved in multiclass classification, as ex-
pected because synthetic samples are not considered when 
training the classifier. For one-class classification, the syn-
thetic samples generated with the GAN network are capable 
of fooling the classifier more times compared to the other 
types of synthetic samples. The same applies to multiclass 
training. 
 To better understand the results, Figure 3 shows the prob-
ability functions of the six features proposed for the three 
types of touch signals (i.e. humans and both synthetic gen-
eration methods). Synthetic distributions do not completely 
fit the human distributions, but they present a behavior sim-
ilar to the human samples. First, we can observe that the 
Move Efficiency of the handcrafted trajectories is equal to 
1, this happens because in swipe trajectories with straight 
line shape the distance and displacement are equal. This is 
the reason why the one-class classifier detects these syn-
thetic trajectories so easily. Note that the Duration (length) 
of both handcrafted and GAN synthetic swipes were com-
puted as a Gaussian distribution with the same mean and 
standard deviation as the human ones so both probability 
distributions are equal. Regarding Distance and Displace-
ment, the GAN trajectories fit worse than the handcrafted 
ones. We suggest that the main reason for this is that the 
GAN network generates smoother swipe trajectories than 
the human ones without abrupt direction changes, causing 
longer displacements in less distance (like a parabolic func-
tion). Finally, the Velocity Profile of both synthetic swipe 
trajectories are very similar to the human ones, the initial 
acceleration applied to the function-based trajectories repro-
duces human behaviors with great similarity while the GAN 
network learns very realistic Velocity Profiles of human 
swipe trajectories as well. 
 The combination of touch and accelerometer features out-
perform the previous results with more than 50% error re-
duction in bot detection. These results suggest the potential 
of multimodal approaches. Finally, Table 4 shows the per-
formance when the generation method of fake samples used 
for training and testing are different. As it is expected, the 
EER increases when training samples does not include the 
 Bot Generation 
SVM Training Handcrafted GAN 
One-class (Tou) 38.3 46.7 
Multiclass (Tou) 2.2 4.1 
One-class (Tou+Acc) 0 23.2 
Multiclass (Tou+Acc) 0 0.8 
Cross-Multiclass (Tou+Acc) 10.1 7.2 
Table 4. Equal Error Rate (%) in bot detection for the different 
scenarios including human and synthetic samples (i.e. Hand-
crafted, and GAN). In Cross-Multiclass experiments, the SVM 
is trained with fake samples of one generation method, and eval-
uated with the second one (e.g. the 10.1% was obtained training 
with HC samples and testing with GAN samples).  
 
Figure 3. Probability functions of the six global features for human, handcrafted, and GAN swipe trajectories. 
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same generation method employed for the evaluation. How-
ever, the system is capable of maintaining a correct classifi-
cation rate around 90%. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have explored the potential of mobile de-
vices to model human-machine interaction. We present a 
novel multimodal mobile database HuMIdb that comprises 
14 mobile sensors captured from 600 users in an unsuper-
vised scenario. Although in this paper we focus on the Hu-
MIdb for bot detection, this new dataset offers multiple re-
search opportunities and challenges.  
 We introduce a new CAPTCHA system based on the 
analysis of signals from inbuilt sensors. This behavioral in-
formation acquired through mobile sensors describe inner 
human features, such as neuromotor abilities, cognitive 
skills, human routines, and habits. All these patterns can 
help to develop new bot detection algorithms for mobile sce-
narios. We have evaluated the method using both human 
swipes trajectories (HuMIdb samples) and synthetic (bot 
samples). The results obtained reveal the potential of these 
signals to model human device interaction. Future works 
will include new approaches that exploit complementarity 
between tasks and sensors, and smart fusion to exploit het-
erogeneity of the data (Fierrez et al. 2018b). 
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